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Abstract— With the advancement in virtualization
technology, virtual machines (VMs) are becoming a
common and integral part of datacenters. As the
popularity and the use of VMs increases, incidents
involving them are also on the rise. There is
substantial research on using VMs and virtual
appliances to aid forensic investigation, but research
on the appropriate forensics procedures for collecting
and analyzing evidence within a VM following is
lacking.
This paper presents a forensically sound way to
acquire and analyze VM hard disks. A forensics tool
for analyzing VM snapshots and vmdk files is
developed and has been proven to be forensically
sound.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, computer systems such as desktops and
servers have been considered physical devices. With the
introduction of virtualization in the IT industry, this may
no longer be the case.
With the benefits of virtualization, virtualization is
becoming a widely adopted practice across organizations
of various sizes [2, 13]. VMware is a popular provider of
virtual machine (VM) software and holds a large share of
the market. Products offered by VMware include
VMware Workstation, VMware Server, and VMware
ESXi among others. With the growing trend in
virtualization, more and more production systems,
workstations and desktops are being virtualized. Being a
popular provider, VMware virtual environments are likely
to be encountered by forensic investigators. To address
the increase in exposure to VMs, this research will focus
on acquisition and analysis of VMware products.

VMware VMs are implemented using virtual adapters for
devices such as network cards, memory, etc. The VM,
however, is stored in a set of files. VMware Workstation
creates files with extension like virtual machine
configuration (.vmx), virtual hard drive (.vmdk), snapshot
of the virtual machines’ memory
(.vmem) etc [18]. The conventional methods for incident
response and evidence acquisition - such as pulling the
plug of a machine containing the VMs or suspending and
resuming the VMs to gather evidence - may not be the
best solution for forensic analysis of VMs since resuming
a VM could potentially change both volatile and nonvolatile evidence leaving the evidence to be NOT
admissible to court.
In this paper, the authors propose a sound forensics
methodology to acquire and analyze VMs hard disk
evidence by utilizing the VMware artifact – the VM files.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the existing work performed in the area of
forensic analysis of VMs. A forensically sound procedure
to acquire and analyze virtual hard disks is presented in
Section 3. The authors also present a forensics tool for
analyzing VM snapshots and vmdk files and prove it to be
forensically-sound in section 3. In Section 4, the authors
evaluate the proposed forensic analysis tool. Section 5
addresses the limitations of the proposed methodology.
This paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Kruse & Heiser [11], the conventional
forensic process can be broadly classified into four main
phases, namely Acquire, Preserve, Analyze and Report.
The acquisition state of the process involves capturing as
much volatile system data as possible, then powering
down the system and creating a forensic image of all the
remaining non-volatile storage devices that are found [5].
A forensic image of a device is a bit-by-bit copy of the
drive. The bit stream copy can be either stored as a file on

another device or can directly be copied to another drive
of similar or greater capacity. The bit stream copy of the
storage drive is generally acquired using a dd based tool
[15]. This image is stored in a raw format supported by a
dd or a propriety format which is typically based on dd
[16]. The acquired image is either an identical copy of the
storage device, for example dd image, or the data from the
device which is stored in a format that can be used to
evaluate the contents and presented in court as
permissible evidence. Analysis can be conducted using
any of the many open-source or propriety tools available
such as Sleuthkit [17], Forensics ToolKit [1], EnCase [9]
etc.
Most of the research conducted in the area of
virtualization and forensics, makes use of VMs as
forensics tools. VMs can be used to conduct analysis of
evidence. VMs provide the examiner the ability to have a
clean operating system without having to wipe a drive and
install a fresh operating system on it for every new case.
Helix [7] & Penguin Sleuth Kit Virtual Computer
Forensics and Security Platforms [6] are popular Linuxbased operating systems tailored for forensics acquisition
and analysis. Both platforms are readily available as
virtual appliances that can be used with VMware
products. Similarly other virtual appliances are available
which use virtualization to assist in conducting a forensic
investigation.
Mrdovic et al. used a tool called Live View, which creates
a VMware VM from a raw image of a drive or a physical
drive [14]. Guo et al. use a similar process of using Live
View to boot an image acquired by dd and use that to
augment their static forensic methods [10]. This enables
the investigator to boot up the disk in a virtual
environment and gain an interactive, user-level
perspective of the suspect’s environment. All this is done
without modifying the image or the physical drive and is
considered to be forensically sound.
As incidents related to VMs are on the rise, they have
caught the attention of forensics experts. New methods to
collect evidence from VMs are needed. Fiterman and
Durick in their article titled “Ghost in the Machine:
Forensic Evidence Collection in the Virtual Environment”
point out that tools and options that enable an examiner to
investigate virtual data are currently limited [8]. Similar
concerns regarding the absence of forensics tools and
procedures for VM analysis are raised and methodologies
are proposed by Beek [4]. He also suggests a tool which
compares the memory files (.vmem) of snapshots created
by VMware products for any new files or processes.

Bares [2] in his research studied the amount of data that
could be recovered from VMs in a NTFS partition. His
research also showed that lesser amounts of data were
recoverable if the VM was incorrectly shut down as
compared to when it was shutdown gracefully. In this
paper, we propose a solution that is able to acquire and
analyze VM hard disk evidence on a running VM, without
shutting down, in order to preserve the most evidence
with the least number of modifications.
In conclusion, there is abundant research on using VMs
and virtual appliances to aid forensic investigation, but
research on collecting and analyzing evidence from VMs
hard disk is lacking. The proposed forensics methodology
provides forensics examiners a forensics sound procedure
and tool to acquire and analyze VMs hard disk images
using only the existing VM files.
3. FORENSICALLY-SOUND PROCEDURE FOR
VIRTUAL DISK ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
The use of VMs in corporate and personal environments
is rapidly increasing; 18% of servers were virtualized in
2009 and that grew to 25% in 2010. It is expected that by
2012, about half of the servers hosted will be virtualized
and hosted virtual desktops will reach 49 million units by
2013 [13]. With the growing number of virtual systems it
becomes imperative that a methodology to analyze virtual
systems is developed. Many systems carry out critical
tasks that cannot be stopped. If such systems are
compromised, or are suspected of being compromised,
they cannot be taken offline for analysis. In such a
scenario it becomes important to conduct a live analysis
of the system. However, when a live analysis is carried
out, the investigator may change information that resides
in memory and any remaining open network connections
will be terminated. According to Kurse & Heiser [11], the
common practice to conduct forensic analysis of a
physical machine is to take the machine offline at some
point. The machine’s hard disk is then imaged, and its
data acquired for analysis.
When VMs are involved in an incident, the VM is usually
suspended or a snapshot of the machine is created to
preserve the processes and network status for forensics
analysis. There are two paths that a forensics investigator
can follow: a) resume the suspended VM and use the
normal procedure to acquire and analyze the live
machine, and b) analyze the VM files without resuming
the suspended machine. However, the method of
resuming a suspend VM before acquisition may

potentially change the evidence, leading to the possibility
that the evidence will NOT be legally admissible.
In this section, the authors describe a forensics solution to
acquire, preserve, and analyze snapshots of disk images
using VM suspend or snapshot of VM files created by the
VMware utility without resuming or shutting down VMs.
3.1 Virtual Disk Acquisition
The aim of forensic image acquisition is to minimize
contamination and ensure legally-admissible evidence. To
accomplish this, the digital evidence acquisition process
has to follow an appropriate procedure. Acquiring nonvolatile data from a physical hard disk entails many steps
[11]. A machine is first powered off by disconnecting the
power supply from the machine (i.e. pulling the plug).
The hard disk is then removed from the suspect machine
and connected to a forensic analysis machine. The hard
disk is then imaged using any of the many tools available
for imaging a disk such as dd, FTK Imager, EnCase, etc.
This image is then used by a forensics investigator to
conduct an analysis of the events the machine may have
experienced.
When working with suspended VMware images, there are
two options for acquiring the virtual disks: resuming the
suspended system, then use bit-by-bit copy or to directly
work with the VMware .vmdk and snapshots files. The
problem with resuming a VM is that during the resume
process, many files stored on the hard disk are changed,
which may destroy evidence. Another disadvantage of
resuming the suspended VM is the loss of information
stored in the memory as the state of the VM changes.
Such information could be vital to the investigation being
carried out.
To overcome the shortcomings of resuming the suspended
VM, the better solution is to create a snapshot of the VM
and then work directly with the VM files that are stored
on the host system. Upon taking a snapshot, the state of
the hard disk is preserved and any changes to the disk are
stored in a separate file. The virtual memory of the VM is
stored in a file and any state changes are written to
another virtual memory file. Following this procedure, we
ensure that the evidence is preserved and can be presented
to court as forensically sound and admissible evidence.
Both EnCase and FTK support conversion of .vmdk files
to raw (dd) format. When FTK is pointed to a snapshot
for converting it to a raw image, it converts the snapshot
along with any previous snapshots and the base vmdk
files (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: FTK acquiring .vmdk in raw (dd) format.
When EnCase is pointed to the base clean vmdk files, it
successfully converts them to raw/dd format, but when
EnCase is pointed to a later snapshot, it only converts the
delta that is created after snapshoting a VM. As a result,
to include the previous snapshots and the base images as
well, one has to assimilate a flat vmdk file by using
utilities that are packaged with VMware Workstation,
namely
vmware-vdiskmanager.exe.
Vmwarevdiskmanager.exe creates one vmdk file that includes: the
selected snapshot, any previous snapshots and the base
vmdk files. The resulting single vmdk file can then be
converted to raw/dd format using EnCase (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: EnCase acquiring .vmdk in raw (dd) format.
3.1.1 Forensically Sound Virtual Disk Acquisition
It is now clear that both FTK and EnCase can acquire the
contents of the virtual hard disk without shutting down
the VM if a snapshot of this machine is created at the time
of incident response. The next question is whether this
solution is forensically sound. In other words, do FTK
Imager and EnCase change the original VM disk image?
In general, both FTK imager and EnCase require a
write blocker device to image a live physical drive.
However, since VMware virtual disks are implemented as
files, can they be acquired without the use of a write

blocker device using FTK and EnCase? In this
experiment, the authors studied the functionality of both
tools when applied to VM file conversion. In particular,
the authors used both tools to create raw images for VM
hard disks and calculated hashes of the raw images. We
found that both tools produced the matching MD5 and
SHA1 hashes, as can be seen from figures 3a & 3b.
Therefore, we conclude that VM hard disk files can be
safely converted to raw/dd images using either tool
without relying on a write block device.

If the guest system clock is synchronized with the host
system clock, the incident response professional should
make sure to check if the host system time is correct else
he should record the skew. If the guest is using an
external source besides the host system clock to
synchronize the time, any skew that exists should be
recorded. The Forensics Snapshot Tool takes into account
the time skew of the guest operating system to conduct
analysis.
3.2 Forensics Snapshot Analysis Tool

Figure 3a: MD5 & SHA1 sums obtained from FTK
Imager

Figure 3b: MD5 & SHA1 sums obtained from EnCase
3.1.2 Guest System Time Skew
When the guest system (the VM) is being acquired it is
critical for the incident response professional to record the
time of the guest operating system as well as that of the
host operating system. The time of the guest operating
system could be skewed and if this is recorded the
forensic examiner can make more definitive and accurate
statements about activities that may have taken place.

With the acquired image from section 3.1, one can use
open-source or commercial forensics tools, for example,
EnCase, FTK, and Sleuthkit to conduct a forensics
analysis. However, with the additional VM files created
from the VM and features supported by VMware, are
there other efficient techniques that could assist forensics
investigation?
VMware offers the Snapshot feature that allows one to
freeze the state of a VM at a given point of time [18]. In
this research, the authors developed a Forensics Snapshot
Analysis tool that compares the snapshot with a pre-staged
(recorded at an earlier time) snapshot to identify possible
malicious activities.
This tool is written as a Bash script and incorporates
existing tools, such as Sleuthkit and md5sum, to verify
the integrity of the evidence and also automate parts of
the forensic analysis. The script extracts files from both
the clean and the compromised image snapshots. Then a
comparison is made to determine the changes detected such as files created, changed or deleted. The tool is also
capable of identifying MAC time changes, content
changes and permission changes. These modified files are
reported and can then be further investigated by a
forensics examiner.
To prove that the Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool is a
forensically sound, the authors computed the MD5
checksum of the image before and after applying this tool
and found that the hash results are identical. This
validates that the tool does not modify the evidence files
or their contents.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Experiment Setup
Suspect virtual Machine:

For our experiments, VMware Workstation 7.0.1 was
installed on a Windows 7 Home Premium operating
system with a New Technology File System (NTFS)
partition. A Fedora 14 operating system was installed in
VMware Workstation using an extended file system (ext),
viz. ext3, with 10GB of disk space. Once the system was
installed a snapshot was taken to establish a clean base
system. Various packages were installed and changes to
various files were made. Changes to file permissions such
as execute bit, set user ID, etc. were also made to emulate
a real world scenario where a malicious user might
change file permissions to gain access to restricted parts
of a system. Once these actions were performed, another
snapshot of the VM was made. Since FTK Imager is a
better solution to convert .vmdk and snapshot files to a
completed raw image, we used FTK Imager to convert
both the snapshots and create a raw disk images.
Forensics Analysis Machine:
Another Fedora 14 operating system was installed as a
VM which was used for forensics analysis with the
Forensics Snapshot Analysis Tool and its dependencies
such as Sleuthkit and md5sum installed.

snapshots of the same virtual machine taken at different
points in time. Using the tool, a forensics examiner can
generate a list of files that have been added, deleted,
modified and changed by comparing the snapshots. The
tool produces formatted reports of each analysis
procedure it carries out. The forensics examiner can then
decide on areas of further investigation based on the items
of interest generated by the Forensics Snapshot Analysis
tool.
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool is forensically
sound and does not modify the raw files in any way. This
can be proven by computing the hashes of the raw files
after analysis is complete. The MD5 & SHA1 hashed
computed for the raw files after the tool has analyzed the
raw files match the hashes computed before analysis was
run.

4.2 Analysis and Results
The experiment follows the processes shown in Figure 4.

Figure 5: Output of Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool
showing a list of recently deleted files

VMware Workstation 7.0.1
Install on Windows 7

4.3 Other usage of this tool
VM1: Suspect
Machine

VM2: Forensics
Analysis Machine

Snapshot 1
Created for a
Clean Base Image

Setup: Various tool
installation such as
Sleuthkit, Autopsy,
etc

File changes made:
Deletions,
Additions, Edits, etc

Snapshot 2 Created
for a unclean/
compromised Image

Development of
BASH script to
analyze snapshots

FTK Image/
EnCase

Analysis

raw/dd images of
Snapshot 1 & 2

Analysis
results

Figure 4: Flow Chart of the processes
As shown in Figure 5 below, the Forensics Snapshot
Analysis tool successfully analyzes and compares

This tool can also be used to study OS behavior. One
example would be inode reallocation. In some OSes, if a
new file is created soon after deleting an existing file, the
inode used by the deleted file is marked as “not in use”
and could be assigned to a new file. This result can be
seen from Figure 5 above when the file del_me.txt is
deleted and added2.txt is created. The inode of file
del_me2.txt is assigned to added2.txt.
5. LIMITATIONS: POSSIBLE METHODS OF
OBFUSCATION
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool relies heavily on
the MAC time of files to generate files of interest. A
possible method for obfuscation could be the use of a tool
that does not modify MAC times of files. TrueCrypt is
one such tool. Depending on how the preferences are set,
when a TrueCrypt volume is modified it can be
configured to update only the change time, leaving the
modification (mtime) and access (atime) times

unchanged. The authors used TrueCrypt with their script
to study this behavior of TrueCrypt and added features to
the script which now checks for change time (ctime)
difference between the files found in both snapshots.
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool cannot view the
contents of files that have been encrypted. The tool will
still list files which have differing modification & change
times but the examiner will not be able to view the
contents of the file, if it is encrypted. A method to analyze
encrypted files and volumes can be developed and
incorporated in the tool.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The authors studied the solutions for acquiring and
analyzing live virtual machines based on VM files. A
forensically sound procedure to acquire virtual disk
images is provided. In addition, the snapshot analysis
tool, Forensics Snapshot Analysis, was developed. It is a
powerful tool for forensics investigators to analyze VM
hard disk images and present pertinent evidence in court.
This tool can also be useful in incident response to
confirm a breach and to carry out further forensic
analysis.
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool can also be used for
academic and training purposes. Students are taught that
booting a suspect machine or VM that has been shutdown
or suspended can modify the contents, changing potential
evidence. Snapshots of a shutdown or suspended VM can
be acquired before and after booting and these snapshots
can be analyzed using the tool developed which will
practically demonstrate why booting is not a forensically
sound procedure.
Several avenues can be pursued as an extension to this
research. The effect of encrypted files and volumes on the
analysis conducted by this tool can be studied further.
Changes can be made to the developed tool to handle
other file systems such as FAT, NTFS and other file
systems.
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